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In this study, we explore and unpack how the potential value of two broad classifications of experience
? depth and breadth ? shift and change as the industry evolves. We suggest that experience breadth
builds organizational flexibility that is especially valuable during times of transition, while experience
depth builds powerful resources that are especially important during stable periods. By testing our
theory in the console video game industry, where game developers face repeated periods of transition
and maturity across multiple console generations, we both reduce concerns about endogeneity and
offer novel theory about how and why the value of experience depth ? though reduced by transition ?
may generally increase over the industry's evolution, while experience breadth may correspondingly




Organizational experience has direct, important implications for a firm's future success. 
Through learning-by-doing (Argote & Epple, 1990; Levitt & March, 1988), experience provides 
knowledge that forms the building blocks of organizational capabilities (Helfat & Lieberman, 
2002). Experience has been shown to increase productivity (Darr, Argote & Epple, 1995) and 
product quality (Levin, 2000; Adams, Day and Dougherty, 1998; Salvato, 2009). Research has 
sought to articulate different types of experience, recognizing that the effect of heterogeneous 
types of experience will likely be different (Beckman & Haunschild, 2002; Hoang & Rothaermel, 
2010). Primarily, this involves the distinction between experience breadth – experience engaging 
in many different activities – and experience depth – experience repeating relatively similar 
activities (Holmqvist, 2004; Huber, 1991; Nerkar & Roberts, 2004). 
Despite the potential importance of organizational experience for firm outcomes, the effect 
of experience is not likely to be consistent over the evolution of the firm and the industry. This is 
especially true of different types of experience – some experience may be most helpful during the 
early, more dynamic phases of industry evolution, while others may be more relevant as the 
industry matures. This aligns with perspectives highlighting the changes in key success factors 
through the industry's evolution – different capabilities matter more at some times than at others. 
In this study, we explore and unpack how the potential value of two broad classifications 
of experience – depth and breadth – shift and change as the industry evolves. We suggest that 
experience breadth builds organizational flexibility that is especially valuable during times of 
transition, while experience depth builds powerful resources that are especially important during 
stable periods. By testing our theory in the US console video game industry for years 1995-2009, 
where game developers face repeated periods of transition and maturity across multiple console 
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generations, we both reduce concerns about endogeneity and offer novel theory about how and 
why the value of experience depth – though reduced by transition – may generally increase over 
the industry's evolution, while experience breadth may correspondingly become less important 
over time. 
Our results offer two main findings. First, we find that experience breadth impacts new 
product performance positively during times of generational transitions, yet otherwise has a 
negative impact during stable periods. Second, we find that experience depth matters more as the 
industry itself stabilizes and matures across technological generations, impacting new product 
performance increasingly positively as years pass in the industry. 
This perspective that breadth matters more during turbulent periods is in line with the 
limited research testing the shifting value of dynamic versus ordinary capabilities (Drnevich & 
Kriaciunas, 2011; Schilke, 2014). In fact, if we view experience breadth as generating dynamic 
capabilities, which is in line with King & Tucci (2002), Eggers (2012), and Zollo & Winter (2002), 
then our paper can be viewed as an additional empirical test of dynamic capabilities theory that 
both supports the shifting value of dynamic capabilities but also highlights important, cross-
generational boundary conditions on the value of such capabilities. 
In addition, this study contributes to the literature on platform evolution and the ways in 
which platforms influence the outcomes of complementary products. Platform companies make 
significant investments in complementor-management strategies (Boudreau & Hagiu, 2009; 
Wareham, et al, 2014), and platform-side dynamics have important and understudied implications 
for the performance of complementors (see Rietveld & Eggers, 2018, for an exception). Our study 
articulates how the generational shifts extant in many platform markets (e.g., computers, mobile 
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networks) can have a significant "resetting" effect on the competencies of complementors, offering 
an opportunity for new firms to enter and compete with existing incumbents. 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Studies on the effects of experience on firm performance – whether productivity or product success 
- have suggested that separating different types of experience to be useful (Moorman and Miner, 
1997; Holmqvist, 2004; Nerkar and Roberts, 2004; Mannor, 2009; Salvato, 2009; Eggers, 2012). 
These could be summarized as breadth and depth of experience – former one capturing experience 
engaging in same broad activity in many different domains, customizing processes for each 
different domain, latter one capturing similar experiences over time and building focused 
competence. In particular, it has been highlighted that breadth of experience is related to first order 
(dynamic) capabilities as firms learn how to modify their processes and capabilities as expanding 
the scope of activities, and depth of experience is related to zero order (operational) capabilities as 
firms undertake better that particular activity (Teece et al. 1997, and King and Tucci, 2002, Winter 
2003, Eggers, 2012). 
In understanding the shifting value of experience over time within an industry, industry 
evolution provides the required lens as it is interested in the change in industry characteristics such 
as competitive dynamics and patterns of innovation as time passes within an industry (Klepper, 
1996; Agarwal et al., 2002). Two most prominent ideas in this literature are the concepts of 
technological discontinuities (Dosi, 1982; Anderson and Tushman, 1990) represented by 
technology life cycles and learning regime changes (Winter, 1984; Breschi, Malerba, and 
Orsenigo, 2000), represented by industry life cycles. 
 
 4 
In some industries, industry life cycles coincide with their technology life cycles, however 
in some others, multiple generations of technologies come and go within the same industry life 
cycle, which require firms to transition from one generation of technologies to the next one 
(Anderson and Tushman, 1990). These generational shifts play a particularly important role in 
technological platforms such as video game consoles, smartphones and enterprise IT systems due 
to multi-sidedness of these markets. Platform owners make significant investments to come up 
with new generation of technologies, however facing a great uncertainty for competing in this new 
cycle of the technology, and complementors face both new opportunities with an advanced 
technology but also a need to adapt in order to develop new skills and capabilities to innovate in 
these newer generation of technologies – such as independent game developers creating both new 
programming approaches as well as experimenting with new gameplay elements in each new 
generation of game consoles (Rietveld and Eggers, 2018; Ozalp, Cennamo, Gawer, 2018). 
 
Experience & Generational Transitions 
According to the technological discontinuity view industries are characterized by a cyclical 
model of technical change. Radical innovations create a discontinuity in technology by 
dramatically advancing the performance and initiate an era of ferment which is later followed by 
an era of incremental change. The transition period – i.e., early period of ferment - is a 
discontinuous shock that requires firms to have new configurations of their knowledge and 
capabilities (Chen et al., 2012). Transition periods require firms to change their innovation focus 
from elaborating existing products to pursue the potential of the new technology through major 
innovations. This is especially true when these technological transitions are accompanied by 
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changes in customer demand as well as in technology (Adner, 2002; Tripsas, 2009; Chen et al., 
2012). 
Breadth of experience will increase in value during the transition periods as it builds an 
ability to be dynamic and reconfigure the processes – through the previous experiences in 
expanding the activities to new domains, the firm learns how to engage in new activities, adapting 
to changing conditions (Eggers, 2012). On the other hand, technological transitions fundamentally 
change activities in the existing market domains, which diminishes the value of experience depth. 
Although it may not be fully destroyed, at least it will need to go through a process to adapt to new 
technological cycle to be useful and transitioned to the next generation. 
On the other hand, stable periods of the technology cycles emphasize incremental 
innovation and elaboration of existing knowledge in domains. During these stable periods, 
experience depth becomes valuable through usual learning-by-doing mechanisms, and acts as an 
operational capability (Helfat and Raubitschek, 2000; Siggelkow, 2003). However, experience 
breadth diminishes in value as such experience is valuable changing and turbulent conditions, yet 
in stable conditions it may even become costly to maintain such a capability due to reduced 
opportunities to apply it (Zollo and Winter, 2002; Shamsie et al., 2009). Therefore, we predict the 
following hypotheses regarding generational shifts: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The impact of experience depth on performance decreases during 
technological transition periods. 
Hypothesis 2: The impact of experience breadth on performance increases during 




Experience & Industry Maturity 
Most prominent lens in explaining maturation through prototypical phases of lifecycle in 
an industry is based on evolutionary economics, and this view argues that sources of knowledge 
leading to the innovative activity determine evolutionary patterns (Gort and Klepper, 1982). More 
specifically, patterns are formed by the changing learning (technological) regime of the industry, 
which determines the properties of the knowledge base leading to favorable innovative activity 
(Breschi, Malerba, and Orsenigo, 2000).  
In the growth phase of the industry, an entrepreneurial regime drives innovation (Winter, 
1984). In this period, source of knowledge critical in generating innovation lies outside of the 
established practices in the industry. As such, entrants come to the industry with product 
innovation in order to use their knowledge advantage (Agarwal et al., 2002). In this earlier phase 
of an industry, experimentation through broader experiences drive value, whereas deeper 
experiences have limited use due to the shifting nature of the industrial environment. 
As the industry matures, innovation is driven by routinized regime (Breschi, Malerba, and 
Orsenigo, 2000). In that period, innovation is increasingly determined by incremental process 
innovations and therefore it favors firms with high stocks of market specific knowledge. These 
practices will require the firm to compete in incremental innovation, as survival and performance 
now is dependent on elaborating existing designs or technologies. Such patterns are either reflected 
in increasing cost-based competition (Klepper, 1996) or increasing R&D expenditures to compete 
(Klepper, 1997) in order to survive and thrive. Depth of experience will increase in usefulness as 
an industry matures since refinement and familiarity that comes through development of domain 
specific knowledge allows the firm to be competitive. On the other hand, broader experiences will 
diminish in value as the industry-level stabilization occurs, and even if renewal maybe needed for 
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periods of transition, at the industry level this may reflect smaller changes in a mature industry 
environment. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The impact of experience depth on performance increases as an industry 
matures. 
Hypothesis 4: The impact of experience breadth on performance decreases as an industry 
matures. 
METHODS AND SETTING 
Started from its humble beginnings in early 1970s, US video game industry has become 
one of the major entertainment industries, reaching to a revenue of 25 billion dollars even by the 
end of our observation period in 2010 (Entertainment Software Association, 2011). This setting 
could be summarized in 3 main points. First, video game industry is a mix between creative and 
knowledge-intensive industries, involving both entertainment and innovation (Mollick, 2012). 
Second, there are two types of organizations in the software side of video game industry, working 
together in product development: game developers and publishers.1 Game developers are 
responsible with the creative and technical side of game development. These developers are almost 
always organizations as well as firms, and not sole individuals (Mollick, 2012). Publishers are 
gatekeepers and provide financing for developers, as well as market and distribute their games. 
Since publishers take risks by funding developers, they both oversee and work together with them 
by supporting developers with their advice. Publishers play a great role in determining a game’s 
success by their provision of resources and consequent marketing (Piezunka, 2014). Publishers 
                                               
1 Another organization relevant to the industry is console owners – that represents the hardware side of the industry. 




could also own in-house game developers, which are called “studios”.2 In this study, we will be 
considering publishers to test our hypotheses, with various controls accounting for developers. 
Third, success of games is associated with uncertainty, yet fulfilling the needs of consumers is still 
dependent on the quality of a video game compared to other games (Tschang, 2007) – and 
consequently success is still considerably dependent on knowledge and capabilities of firms in the 
industry. 
The video game industry is a particularly good setting to test how evolutionary changes 
affect the value of breadth and depth of experience. First, products and learning from product 
development experiences play a central role in this industry. Firms need to continually develop 
new products as an average product makes over %80 of its sales in 12 months (Dezso et al., 2010). 
Second, there are clearly identifiable technological lifecycles, which presents both challenges of 
adapting to a new set of technologies and game development approaches as well as opportunities 
to develop new types of games (Ozalp, Cennamo, and Gawer, 2018). Third, the console game 
market conforms to the industry evolution patterns due to immense increase in the product 
development costs, and later shakeout of firms from the industry. 
In the video game industry, there are technological discontinuities in the form of new 
generations of console releases (Balland et al., 2012; de Vaan, 2014). On average every 5 years, a 
new console generation replaces the old one and it presents both opportunities and challenges for 
firms. On one hand, industry insiders highlight new opportunities: “each transition to new 
generations of hardware has always been accompanied by the introduction of these new and 
original game concepts that become defining games for that particular generation” (de Vaan, 2014; 
p.1670). However, this also poses challenges for publishers since they need to provide new tools 
                                               
2 These studios could be given access to different resources compared independent game developers. We control for 
this in our analysis. 
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and resources for developers as well as able to match with changing market requirements of the 
new technological generation. Perhaps even more important, the big challenge for the publisher is 
to able to match itself these changing consumer preferences, and how its games will be received 
both in its existing categories (i.e., genre), and new ones. In line with the discontinuous technical 
changes, market uncertainty (as well as technical uncertainty) increases following the release of a 
new generation consoles as it is not clear early on which kind of innovations, or genres will be 
favored by consumers in that generation. So, although it could be argued that technological 
changes are “expected” in that industry these changes in the market pose a real dilemma for 
publishers in the industry.3 Figure 1 provides the generations of video game consoles with their 
transition and stability periods, whereas Figure 2 provides the market share changes between 
genres within the industry following the release of new consoles.4 
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
Last, although being a creative industry, this industry has matured over time due to 
immensely increasing product development costs, not much different than Klepper’s (1997) idea 
that increasing product R&D expenditures (p.151) as an alternative mechanism for industry 
lifecycle changes. This change could be best reflected with the mean number of people working 
in producing games, as this reflects most of the fixed costs involved in this industry. This has 
caused a shakeout of firms in the industry, conforming to broader industry life cycle patterns as 
explained by Klepper (1996). In Figure 3, it could be seen that mean number of people worked in 
                                               
3 “With target audiences and video game consumption constantly evolving, it is ssential for a publisher to correctly 
anticipate market trends and to choose the proper format for a game. This strategic choice is crucial, given the sums 
invested.” (Ubisoft, 2009) 
4 These values are calculated by using the sales data and genre information of NPD research, which we will explain 
in the Methods section. 
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producing games has tremendously increased over time and gross entry rates (publishers and 
developers combined) has decreased after 2002.5 Tschang (2007) documents that these changes 
have been coupled with “rationalization”, which is predominant focus on productivity-oriented 
processes, similar to adoption of incremental innovation oriented processes explained by Benner 
and Tushman (2002). This would be also in-line with the (relatively) mature phase as told by the 
industry evolution literature, which is predominantly characterized by incremental process 
innovation. 
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
Data 
We have relied on multiple sources to build our dataset. The main data source used in this 
study comes from the MobyGames website, which is the oldest and largest online video game 
archive on the Internet (Mollick, 2012; de Vaan, 2014). MobyGames defines its mission as: “To 
meticulously catalog all relevant information about electronic games on a game-by-game basis and 
then offer up that information through flexible queries and data mining.” At the time of data 
collection, Mobygames had information over 72,000 titles, all entered by users of the site on a 
volunteer basis according to a detailed set of data entry instructions. For the accuracy of 
information, Mobygames requires all contributed data to pass through peer review to accept it. The 
data includes title, platform, publisher, developer, credits, release date, release country and 
information on whether a game uses licensed material (e.g., FIFA Soccer). 
Although Mobygames provides publisher (and developer) information for each game, it is 
not able to fully account for parent subsidiary relationships, merger and acquisitions, and name 
                                               
5 Gross entry means total number of firm entries in a given year. Gross entry numbers have been used by industry 
evolution studies (Agarwal and Gort, 1996; Agarwal et al., 2002) to measure industry life cycle phases. 
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changes of publishers and developers. Identification of this information is crucial as otherwise 
main experience variables will be calculated incorrectly, such as not accounting for past history of 
a publisher (and developer for controls) due to name change.  Therefore, publisher and developer 
information on Mobygames have been complemented by additional information collected 
manually from GiantBomb, Wikipedia, official firm websites, and Factiva. Those firms that 
underwent a name change has been associated with only one name to track their experience. 
Activities of firms that are subsidiaries are all subsumed under parent company. If a firm starts out 
as an independent company and then gets acquired, it is treated as an independent firm until 
acquisition and then subsumed under parent company. 
We have collected information on over 72,000 games available on the website. From this 
larger population of releases, only those games released in US until the end of 2011 have been 
kept (since information is entered by users on the website, lately released and less known titles 
may not be observed on the site, biasing the sample). Further, we have removed games that are 
bundles of previously released games and re-releases of same games for different occasions. Also, 
we have removed games that are produced for handheld consoles and mobile devices since they 
represent another market than major game industry, especially for the years in analysis. After these, 
there are 25,399 title-platform releases over the years 1972-2011 released for a personal computer 
or videogame console. Although we have focused a subset of this dataset for analysis as we will 
explain below, we have calculated all firm experience variables by using this larger dataset of 
personal computer (PC) and game console releases to correctly account for game development 
history of each publisher (and developer). 
Following the creation of this dataset, we have chosen to focus one specifically on one 
segment, console games, as opposed to PC games. There are a number of advantages examining 
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console games, which make up majority of sales, and up to 85 percent of the market in the period 
of observation. First, both theoretically and computationally, clear technological lifecycles are 
both observable and measurable in consoles, that is the new generation of console devices released 
in every 5 years on average, and associated with changes in the market as well as game 
development as explained above. Second, releasing a game for a console is significantly more 
resource intensive than release for a personal computer as it requires to have a licensing deal with 
the platform owner, and publishers will need much higher sales numbers to reach breakeven point. 
This makes our dependent variable, game sales, a very fitting measure of performance. Third, 
industry maturation has mostly affected game releases for consoles as they traditionally have 
higher entry barriers than game publishing and development for personal computers. Dropping 
games released for PCs left the data with 11,039 title-platform releases for a video game console. 
Finally, this dataset has been matched with another dataset on game revenues between 
1995-2010 for dependent variable. NPD research tracks the monthly sales data of every console 
game sold through U.S. retail channels for most major retailers, and projects sales for the rest. Due 
to the dependent variable chosen, games that are released before 1995, but are tracked in the NPD 
as of 1995 as well as games released after 2009 February (due to our dependent variable, as 
explained below) are dropped as well. Matching these two datasets, and finally removing games 
that are released in the first year of existence of a publisher (as these firms have no previous 
experience, see Eggers 2012), resulted in our final dataset consisting of 5,750 title-platform 
releases between 1995 January-2009 February for 166 publishers. 
Moreover, NPD research classifies games into genres, which each represents distinct 
market segments regarding the development, marketing and consumption of games: these include 
story, art development, graphic technology, game mechanics, demand segments, marketing, 
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demographics and so on. Therefore, different genres require different kinds of specific capabilities 
to succeed in each genre, not different than in the movie industry as highlighted by Shamsie et al. 
(2009). This is also in line with how capabilities are developed through sequences of experiences 
through developing different products as in Helfat and Raubitschek (2000). In total, the NPD data 
set distinguishes between 53 genres that are quite detailed (e.g., Soccer, Tactical Shooter), as well 
as 13 super-genres (e.g., Sports, Shooter), which represent a higher level aggregation of these 
detailed genres. However, since we need to calculate experience of publishers as of 1995, which 
also includes games they developed before 1995, we built a concordance between NPD genre 
classification and detailed game characteristics provided by the Mobygames data.  As mentioned 
earlier, Mobygames include detailed characteristics on each title which include 8 main genres 
(action, adventure, RPG, simulation, educational, strategy, racing, sports), 6 perspectives (e.g., 1st 
person perspective, 3rd person perspective, side scrolling, etc.), and 88 sub-genre characteristics 
(e.g., shooter, turn-based, etc.) in total resulting in 102 characteristics. In the first step, we re-
created NPD genre and supergenre classification using Mobygames characteristics. This step has 
given us a concordance rate of 62% for genres and over 90% for super-genres.6 We will be using 
detailed genre information only to measure depth of experience, and use supergenre information 





                                               
6 Concordance between NPD data and Mobygames data genres is over 90% for most of the smaller, specialized 
genres (e.g., Basketball, Pinball games, and so on) while it is around 50% for a few very large genres that are both 
similar to each other, and not distinguishable through Mobygames data. These are General Action games vs. 




The definitions of the variables used to test our hypotheses are summarized in Table 1 and detailed 
below. 
------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------- 
 
Dependent Variable  
In line with the product development literature’s focus on product level outcomes (Eggers, 2012), 
revenue is an appropriate performance measure for the game release outcome. As mentioned 
above, this is especially true for console video games, where concerns of sales are stronger due to 
more intense resource commitments and costly licensing deals with platform owners undertaken 
by publishers. Yet, it is more approriate to focus on the revenues of the first year after the release 
only. This is due to two reasons. First, there are differences between games on the time they spend 
on the market. Second, this allows us to avoid censoring the games released in the last year of data. 
As pointed out by the previous research, more than 80% of a video game’s sales occur in its first 
year and pairwise correlation between sales of a game in its first and second years is 99% (Dezsö, 
Groshjean, and Kretschmer, 2012). In addition, Nerkar and Roberts (2004) also focus on initial 
sales since it is a good indicator of new product success, based on previous studies (Gatignon et 
al., 1990). These revenues are also converted to 1995 dollars according to US Consumer Price 
Index. As a last step, since video games is a hit driven industry, we used the more normally 
distributed natural logarithm of revenue (lnrevenue) for our analysis. Therefore, dependent 






In calculating experience variables, we used game releases by the firm in the past five year 
window. This is due to two reasons. First, prior studies on knowledge and innovation considers 
five years as an appropriate time window (Fleming, 2001; Katila and Ahuja, 2002). Second, since 
new generations of consoles are released in five years on average, by this way we also take into 
account that generational changes discount the previously accumulated experience. Also, previous 
studies in the same setting also used a five year window due to the fast changing nature of this 
industry (de Vaan et al., 2014). We also count only unique game releases in calculating experience 
variables. Many games are released for multiple platforms, therefore having multiple title-platform 
releases. However, porting is a technical issue that won’t give any experience to the firm in 
developing a certain genre of game. Additionally, we account for this by controlling for experience 
breadth and depth in platforms (our independent variables are based on experience breadth and 
depth in genres). 
Experience Breadth: The measure of breadth in the publisher’s product release experience is based 
on the Herfindahl index as it reflects the diversity of products the publisher has released in the 
past. It is computed as: !"#$%&ℎ( = *1 −
∑ ./010
∑ (./0)0 1
4, where Nij is the proportion of games released 
by publisher i in the past five years in genre j, that is, the number of games that the firm has in a 
particular genre divided by the total number of games released by the publisher in the past five 
years. NPD supergenres are used for this calculation. This variable ranges between 0 and 1, where 
1 represents maximum diversity. 
Experience Depth: Total volume of experience the publisher has accumulated in the past five years 
within the genre of the focal new game release, logged to deal with overdispersion. NPD genres 
are used for this calculation. 
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(New Technology Generation) Transition: This is the period that starts with the first console 
release of the new technology generation, and ends at the end of the year all consoles for that 
generation is released, taking on average three years. This is chosen to allow new games to be 
released for all consoles in a new generation as it takes several months for all launch titles to 
appear. This measure is also relevant due to being in line with the industry insiders’ comments on 
the challenges of a new generation consoles, as well as capturing the time where previous 
generation consoles are still making majority of hardware sales, reflecting early period of the 
technology life cycle for the new generation. 
Year: This variable measures industry maturity, and it is the number of years since 1995 – the first 
year of our final dataset. 
Control Variables 
Following Eggers (2012), this study treats the overall product development experience of the 
publisher (as well as developer) as a control. Again, experience in the past five year window is 
considered to account for experience decay and it is logged to deal with overdispersion. 
A set of controls relate to the title level. Most important title level factor could be the project 
size itself, which reflects the budget of a game development project. Project Size variable has been 
calculated by using credits information on Mobygames, which is the ratio of the number of people 
worked on the title compared to other titles in the same year. Since credits information is not 
available for all games, those games that do not have this information have been given the ratio of 
1, yet they have been given a value of one for the Assumed Size dummy variable in order to control 
for the bias introduced by this. Another important control is if a title is produced by a vertically 
integrated company, that is both publisher and developer is owned by the same parent company. 
It has been documented that (Tschang, 2007) game development projects differ in terms of 
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incentive and transaction cost issues if a developer is owned by the publisher or not. This is 
controlled with In-house variable. Games could be also based on a movie or franchise license (such 
as Star Wars, NFL or FIFA). Licensed Title variable controls for this. A game could be also a 
sequel, which will be produced upon the success of previous games in the series.  This is controlled 
with the Sequel variable. We also control for blockbuster titles by controlling for releases done in 
months of October and November (high-quality titles self-select to release in these key months of 
the year). 
 At the publisher and developer level, there are three controls. Most important is the 
publisher-level fixed effects for all estimations, and developer-level fixed effects for the robustness 
checks. Second, firm size is also required to be controlled. As pointed out by previous research (de 
Vaan, 2014), it is virtually not possible to collect information on the revenue or number of 
employees for many small development firms. It has been also pointed out that number of games 
released in a year is 0.95 correlated with firm revenue for a subset (p. 1675). Therefore Logged 
Number of Games released in a year controls for firm size. Last controls used at the firm level are 
Publisher Age and Developer Age. Also, video games are produced by console owners as well, 
who would arguably have different incentives as well as information on leveraging new generation 
consoles. Console owner variable controls for this. Finally, we also control for the breadth and 
depth of experience a publisher has in platforms. These variables control for any technical 
confounding effects regarding our hypotheses. 
 As a last set of control variables genre specific and platform specific effects on game 
revenues have been controlled for. At the genre level, some of genres could be more popular than 
others in overall (action vs strategy), and therefore we add genre fixed effects for all NPD genres. 
Again, some platforms may be more popular than others, influencing the revenues of a title in a 
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platform (though note that popularity may not necessarily lead to higher revenues, see Cennamo 
and Santalo, 2013). This is controlled with platform fixed effects. 
 At the industry level, we control for the total logged sales of all games in the release year 
of each game. This variable, however, drops in regressions including interactions with industry 
year as they are very closely correlated. 
Analysis Procedures and Descriptive Statistics 
The models used are OLS with robust standard errors clustered at the publisher level and with 
fixed publisher, platform, and genre effects, with one observation for each new title on a platform 
released. Firm fixed effects are important for two reasons. First, they control for unobserved 
heterogeneity between organizations. Second, they allow for evaluations of how within-firm 
changes in experience variables are affected by evolutionary changes in determining outcomes 
(Eggers, 2012). All independent and control variables are lagged for one year in analysis. 
Summary statistics and correlations are presented in Table 2. It can be seen that none of 
our independent variables are alarmingly correlated. Especially considering our main experience 
variables, breadth and depth, we see that they are correlated at .24. This lends further support to 
the idea that breadth and depth of experience are different dimensions of experience. Several 
control variables, however, show high correlation with some other variables – such as the expected 
correlated between industry year and total size of the industry. In additional regressions, dropping 
these highly correlated variables resulted in no qualitative change in results. 
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Table 3 shows results regarding the relationship between generational transitions and the 
impact of experience depth and breadth on newly released games’ sales performance. Full Model 
with interactions shows that experience depth has significantly lower value during times of 
generational transitions – as can be seen by comparing the coefficients between the main variable 
and its interaction, experience depth has no effect during transitions, and instead has a positive 
effect during stable periods. This supports our Hypothesis 1. Same Full Model shows that breadth 
has significantly higher value during times of generational transition, supporting Hypothesis 2. 
Our post-hoc analysis also shows the source of improved performance through experience breadth 
in times of transition – we find that it comes from releases in genres that are new to the publisher, 
corroborating previous findings in the literature on how experience breadth works as a dynamic 
capability (Eggers, 2012). 
Table 4 shows results regarding the relationship between industry maturity (industry year) 
and the impact of experience depth and breadth on newly released games’ sales performance. Full 
Model 3 shows that experience depth gets more valuable as the industry matures, whereas breadth 
shows minimal change across years in the industry. These results support Hypothesis 3, but do not 
support Hypothesis 4.7 
 
------------------- 
Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here 
------------------ 
                                               
7 Due to space and time constraints, in unreported regressions, we controlled for the robustness of our results. We 
found that our results are robust to the use of different experience breadth measure (entropy) and shows some 
changes based on the definition of transition variable (using individual new consoles, rather than defining transition 
generationally). In particular, we find that the relationship between experience depth and new consoles are getting 
even stronger, whereas the relationship between experience breadth and new consoles get weaker. This could well 
be due to depth relating to specific approaches based on particular genres, and breadth, as a dynamic capability, 




These results could also be corroborated with some qualitative evidence on video game 
publishers. First, considering the technology life cycles, Ubisoft’s CEO Yves Guillemot says that: 
"It's a lot less risky for us to create new IPs and new products when we're in the beginning of a 
new generation... Our customers are very open to new things. Our customers are reopening their 
minds -- and they are really going after what's best. ... At the end of a console generation, they 
want new stuff, but they don't buy new stuff as much”.8 This quite reflects why publishers benefit 
a lot from their deeper experiences well into the technology life cycle, but not at all early on. 
Second, considering the industry life cycle, two prominent examples show how publishers focused 
on benefitting from their deeper experiences, but eventually they are harmed (or failed) when 
broader experience become important again later on. EA (Electronic Arts), which is the biggest 
publisher in the period of observation of my study, has entered a period of loss around 2006, which 
is reflected as the de-maturation period. EA, for years, has been focusing on its genres where it has 
very deep experience, and has been surprised when it started to make losses: “EA became the 
games industry's 800-pound gorilla...monopolise entire genres for years on end. It created 
franchises which were annually refreshed, milking the cash cow anew with each iteration... After 
years when it seemed content to sit back and churn out annual updates and movie licences, EA has 
been brought up short by a stagnation of its income - at a time when its development expenses 
have skyrocketed...” and EA realized that market was changing, and it again become a broader 
company with some more focus on different games, genres and so on: “Riccitiello's sure hand on 
the tiller is guiding the firm back into the kind of waters that Trip Hawkins originally envisioned 
                                               




back in the 1980s, and words like risk, innovation and originality are no longer dirty” 9 And indeed, 
EA has been very successful in the recent years. A last example is from THQ, which was one of 
the biggest publishers just a few years before its bankruptcy. THQ was a publisher that relied on 
many licensed kids’ titles (“family games and children’s games genres in the NPD data), where 
started to have massive losses towards the end of 2000s. It required to change its product 
development strategy, and broaden its genres, especially focusing on bigger titles, which was the 
mandate of the industry, but its previous lack of such experience did not allow it to do so: “The 
company that had generated millions from games based on Finding Nemo and WWE, had 
struggled to transition into a world where kids games and licensed titles were no-longer safe bets... 
In an industry that’s enduring a painful transition away from the triple-A, boxed game model, mid-
tier publishers are the ones that will ultimately get squeezed out. THQ is just the first big victim... 
It is also quite important with projects of this size that THQ was dealing with, that these projects 
are being thought through from start to finish early on, and you don’t run into problems of 
discontinuing development or changing a game concept in the middle of the development.”10 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this study we explored how the value of experience depth and breadth shifts across 
technological transition and stable periods as well between early and more mature stages of an 
industry. In particular, our context also allowed us to explore how changes in the core platform 
technology across generations affects the fortunes of complementors working on these platforms, 
moving beyond the usual standard network effects-based platform research based on the platform 
owner’s perspective (McIntrye and Subramaniam, 2017). Our findings also go beyond the previous 
research on the shifting value of capabilities across multiple generations of technologies and over 
                                               
9 http://www.eurogamer.net/articles/electronic-arts-back-in-the-game-article, accessed 29 October 2015. 
10 http://www.engadget.com/2008/11/05/thq-reveals-significant-business-realignment/, accessed 29 October 2015. 
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15 years of evolution within an industry, which has been previously studied with cross-sectional 
surveys (Drnevich & Kriaciunas, 2011), or short-term longitudinal studies (Schilke, 2014). We 
find that experience breadth indeed works as a first-order dynamic capability during technological 
transition periods, yet, it has its own limitations as experience depth becomes much more valuable 
as the industry matures. This study represents an early step to understand better how the value of 
experience shifts across technological and industry life cycles in a platform context, which 
represent an increasingly growing area of activity for many firms. As more and more firms are 
transitioning to such platforms, we need more research to understand how these complementors’ 
fortunes, which are key to the success of platforms, shift given their experience profiles and the 
shifts on the technologies and industry they belong to. The following discussion highlights our key 
findings that have critical implications for future studies of experience and outcome link, platform 
evolution, and dynamic capabilities literatures. 
First, our central finding that both depth and breadth of experience have contingent effects 
based on generational lifecycles in a platform market context offer implications for studies on 
multi-sided platforms, especially for recent studies offering a “complementor” perspective to 
understand their factors of success and failure (Rietveld and Eggers, 2018; Cennamo, Ozalp, and 
Kretschmer, 2018). In particular, we add to the evidence on how dynamics of the evolution of 
platforms create both turbulence and opportunity for complementors – with relative success of 
failure based on the complementors’ experience profiles. It also provides a direction for further 
ressearch on how platform “context” affects complement dynamics presents interesting 
opportunities for evolutionary idiosyncrasies. 
Second, our finding that the benefits of depth and breadth of experience, reflecting experience-
based ordinary and dynamic capabilities respectively, were contingent on the technology and 
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industry lifecycles hold important implications for the shifting values of these capabilities as well 
as the limits of dynamic capabilities. Previous studies on this subject were mostly based on 
surveys, either cross-sectional (Drnevich & Kriaciunas, 2011) or short-term longitudinal (Schilke, 
2014), which raises serious concerns about survey biases, as well as tautology of equating 
“capability” with the success. Our analysis is able to separate experience from success, looking at 
under which conditions experience-based ordinary and dynamic capabilities are more or less 
valuable in changing conditions within an industry. Our findings show that although broader 
experience base helps in face of change, and indeed may represent such dynamic capabilities, it is 
not without its own costs. Rather, as an industry passes to mature stage from the growth stage, 
such capabilities may become more costly to maintain. This supports the idea of Winter (2003) 
that if there are sparse opportunities for competitively significant changes, then the costs of 
development of integrative knowledge may far exceed benefits acquired from core knowledge. 
Rather, the more “dynamic” capability may reside in making timely choices as per product 
development. In another creative industry, Shamsie et al. (2009) show that it is more important for 
a movie studio to make timely use of its different types of knowledge and capabilities to create a 
series of temporary competitive advantages under changing industry conditions. Further studies 
should delve deeper for understanding such relationships in a longitudinal way to better to 
enlighten us on higher level capability building. 
Finally, our study offers some novel implications for the dynamics of capability development. 
Our finding that, depth of experience increasing in value over time, with some temporary setbacks 
during times of transition, may challenge the received wisdom on inertia and technological change 
in industries. In particular, our findings shows that the increase in the focus of firms becomes more 
valuable as industry progresses – although transitions are potential pitfalls for such focused firms, 
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they may also choose to remain in the older technology until the transition period completes. We 
also found that experience breadth, contrary to our expectations, did not lose its value as the 
industry progressed. It may well be that there is enough constant change in this industry, such that 
the above-mentioned maintenance of dynamic capabilities, in fact, is not costly relative to its 
benefits. Further studies should also look into these dynamics in other contexts. 
Naturally, this study also has limitations. First, a potential issue is unobserved heterogeneity 
in the dataset, which is the concern that the decision of where and when to develop a new game is 
not exogenous (Eggers, 2012). Publishers may in fact be aware of their advantages, and may build 
on their deeper experienced genres to benefit in the mature period of the industry. Given prior 
experiences, this study assesses when a firm may have advantage in developing a product in a 
given time and genre. Another concern could be the industry of this study, which is a creative 
industry and therefore naturally require novelty and familiarity together in order to achieve success 
(Lampel, Lant, and Shamsie, 2000). However, also note that the relative of importance of novelty 
and familiarity is also changing through the industry (Tschang, 2007), which we capture through 
technology and industry lifecycle changes. 
In terms of generalizability, mechanisms argued in this article are based on literatures of 
experience and industry evolution, which studies wide-ranging industries, and therefore 
mechanisms guiding these interactions of experience and industry evolution should be observable 
in many industries. Benefits from breadth of experience rises from integrative knowledge and 
experience heterogeneity, which is discussed or observed in many settings earlier (Helfat and 
Raubitschek, 2002; Haunschild and Sullivan, 2002; King and Tucci, 2002; Schilling et al., 2003; 
Chen et al., 2012), while benefits from depth of experience rises from the core knowledge, that is 
explored in multiple industries in Helfat and Lieberman (2002). Perhaps, it could be true that some 
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industries do not observe multiple technology life cycles, or traditional industry life cycle, but 
most of the industries at least observe one of these major evolutionary changes, which gives 
additional confidence in the generalizability of results. 
In conclusion, prior research has implicitly assumed that industry context remains static in 
looking at the experience-outcome link. In comparison, our theory and results suggest that 
competitive shifts, due to evolutionary forces in an industry has a profound effect whether depth 
and breadth of experience will improve success or not (or may even reduce success). Our findings 
offer important implications for the literatures on complementor strategies in platforms as well as 

















Dependent variable  
Revenue Natural logarithm of the revenues generated by a game in the first year after its 
release (1995 price index converted). 
Independent variables  
Experience Breadth Diversity of product development experience. Calculated as the Herfindahl index, 
reflecting the diversity of products the firm has developed in the past. 
Experience Depth Total volume of experience the firm has accumulated in the within the genre of the 
focal new game release. 
Transition Dummy = one for games released in the years of a technological generation until 
the end of the year all consoles for that generation is released. 
Years Number of years since 1995, starting year of our final dataset. 
Control variables  
Console Owner Dummy = one if game is published by a firm that is also the owner of the focal 
game platform. Active platform owners never publish a game on a rival platform. 
Project Size Relative number of people worked on the title compared to the average of all 
games released in the same year. Game releases with missing information have 
been given a value of one. 
Assumed Size   Dummy = one if game has no project size information available and given one as 
project size value. 
Licensed Title Dummy = one if a game is based on a license. 
Sequel Dummy = one if a game is a sequel in a series. 
In-house Dummy = one if publisher and developer belong to the same parent company. 
Overall Experience Volume Total product development experience in the past five year window.  Calculated 
both for publisher and developer. 
Firm Size Logged number of games released in a year controls for firm size. Calculated both 
for publisher and developer. 
Firm Age Number of years since the first game release of the firm. Calculated both for 
publisher and developer of the focal game. 
Industry Size Logged total sales in the industry in the release year of the game 
Oct. & Nov. Release Dummy = one if game is released either on October or November. Blockbuster 
titles are released during these two months for Christmas. 
Platform Breadth & Depth Controls for the breadth and depth of platform experience of publisher. 
Firm Age Number of years since the first game release of the firm. Calculated both for 











Regressions for the New Product Performance with Moderating Effect of Technological 
Transition 
    
VARIABLES Controls Depth & 
Breadth 
Interactions 
    
Transition -0.001 -0.003 -0.582* 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.283) 
Depth (#games in genre t-5 to t-1)  0.053^ 0.076* 
  (0.029) (0.031) 
Transition X Depth   -0.099* 
   (0.047) 
Breadth (Herfindahl genre t-5 to t-1)  -0.149 -0.497 
  (0.367) (0.374) 
Transition X Breadth   0.916** 
   (0.349) 
Constant 14.602*** 14.638*** 14.781*** 
 (2.229) (2.252) (2.328) 
    
Observations 5,750 5,750 5,750 
R-squared 0.311 0.312 0.314 
Observations (publishers) 166 166 166 
Controls (see Table 1) YES YES YES 
Publisher FE YES YES YES 
Platform FE YES YES YES 
Genre FE YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 













Regressions for the New Product Performance with Moderating Effect of Years Since 1995 
    
VARIABLES Controls Depth & 
Breadth 
Interactions 
    
Depth (#games in genre t-5 to t-1)  0.053^ -0.087 
  (0.029) (0.071) 
Year X Depth   0.018* 
   (0.007) 
Breadth (Herfindahl genre t-5 to t-1)  -0.148 -0.050 
  (0.369) (0.518) 
Year X Breath   0.010 
   (0.074) 
Constant 14.594*** 14.616*** 14.259*** 
 (2.202) (2.222) (2.418) 
    
Observations 5,750 5,750 5,750 
R-squared 0.311 0.312 0.314 
Observations (publishers) 166 166 166 
Controls (see Table 1) YES YES YES 
Publisher FE YES YES YES 
Platform FE YES YES YES 
Genre FE YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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